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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

TIMOTHY G. GARCIA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 930104-CA
Priority No. 2

:

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Timothy G. Garcia relies on his opening
brief and also refers to that brief for the statements of
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts. Appellant
replies to the State's brief as follows.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court's decision, State v. Depaoli, 835
P.2d 162 (Utah 1992), governs the issue in this appeal.

The Depaoli

opinion held that "[s]ince expenses incurred by the prosecution for
investigators are not allowed, it logically follows that costs of
investigation would likewise be ineligible for restitution."
at 165.

Id.

Investigative expenses such as the "code R" examination

incurred by police in the Depaoli rape case are not recoverable
because the cost "was incurred by the prosecution in the course of
the investigation and prior to the time of the filing of the
criminal information."

Id.

The same type of nonrecoverable

investigative expense was incurred here in the undercover "sting"
operation.

A contrary determination by the Oregon court of appeals

does not control the case at bar, as the analysis from the other
jurisdiction neither fully recognizes its own law nor the statutory
differences in Utah.
ARGUMENT
COSTS OF INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION ARE NOT
RECOVERABLE UNDER THE RESTITUTION OR THE DEFENSE
COSTS STATUTES
In its brief, the State argues that State v. Depaoli, 835
P.2d 162 (Utah 1992), does not prohibit the trial court's order of
restitution and that recovery is not improper under State v. Pettitf
698 P.2d 1049 (Or. App.)/ cert, denied, 702 P.2d 1112 (Or. 1985).
Appellee's brief at 4-6.

However, our supreme court's directive in

Depaoli is authoritative and cannot be circumvented by nonbinding
case law, a "sister-state" opinion which interpreted text less
encompassing than the Utah statutes at issue here.
The Depaoli opinion interpreted two statutes: the
restitution statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201, and the defense
costs statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2. While the Utah
supreme court analyzed both provisions in Depaoli, the Oregon court
of appeals only considered the restitution statute in Pettit.
Compare Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 163, with Pettit, 698 P.2d at 1050-51.
The Pettit decision is inadequate under its own law and
under Utah law.

Pettit's limited analysis ignored other relevant

text from Oregon's "Costs" statute, language virtually identical to
Utah's "Defense Costs" statute and language emphasized by Depaoli.
Compare Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.665(1)) (limiting costs to "expenses
specially incurred by the state in prosecuting the defendant") with
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2 (emphasis added) ("Costs shall be limited
to expenses specially incurred by the state or any political
subdivision thereof in prosecuting the defendant, . . . " ) .
Oregon courts have interpreted this phrase, "expenses
specially incurred by the state in prosecuting the defendant[,]" to
mean "those costs incurred by the state after the defendant has been
charged with a crime.

This is because prosecution does not begin

until there is a named defendant who has been charged."

See State

v. Depaolif 835 P.2d 162 (Utah 1992) (construing State v. Haynesy 53
Or. App. 850, 633 P.2d 38 (1981)); Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.665(1).
State v. Pettitf 698 P.2d 1049 (Or. App. 1985), however,
not only overlooked its "Costs" statute, it also ignored the
accompanying interpretation from Haynes.

Cf. State v. Thurman, 846

P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993) ("stare decisis has equal application
when one panel of a multi-panel appellate court is faced with a
prior decision of a different panel").

By contrast, the Utah

supreme court specifically relied on Haynes and its rationale.
Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 164.
Depaoli and Haynes both recognized the limitations placed
on recoverable costs, regardless of whether they are considered
ineligible "expenses specially incurred" or nonqualifying "special
damages."1

"[C]osts of police investigations are not part of costs

1
In accordance with Depaoli, the interpretation of
"expenses specially incurred," see Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2 (from
the defense costs statute), should remain consistent with the
interpretation of "special damages," see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201
(from the restitution statute's definition of "pecuniary damages").
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of prosecution."

Haynes, 633 P.2d 38 cited with approval in

Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 164.

Such costs are not authorized by law.

Additionally, our [Utah's defense costs] statute
contains a provision not specifically contained in the
Oregon statute: 'Costs cannot include attorneys' fees
of prosecuting attorneys or expenses incurred by the
prosecution for investigators or witnesses.'
§ 77-32a-2. Since expenses incurred by the
prosecution for investigators are not allowed, it
logically follows that costs of investigation would
likewise be ineligible for restitution.
Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 164 (construing Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2).
The additional statutory provision contained in Utah's
"Defense Costs" statute is still another consideration omitted from
the Pettit analysis.

Yet the most glaring problem with Pettit,

whose holding has never been accepted by the Oregon supreme court,2
is that if followed the Oregon court of appeals' decision would
essentially overrule the Utah supreme court's decision in Depaoli.
The Depaoli opinion disallowed "expenses incurred by the
prosecution for investigators" and "costs of investigation."

835

2
The holding in State v. Pettit, 698 P.2d 1049 (Or.
App.), cert, denied, 702 P.2d 1112 (Or. 1985), is at odds with State
v. Dillon, 292 Or. 172, 637 P.2d 602 (1982), the cited Oregon
supreme court decision. Pettit's "rescission of an illegal
contract" analysis emphasized recovery and the goal of restoring the
involved parties to their "status quo ante." Pettit, 698 P.2d
at 1051. Although the Oregon court of appeals' opinion correctly
recognized that civil law concepts circumscribe orders of criminal
restitution, ^id., Pettit's compensatory analysis was not
substantively consistent with the governing law of the state supreme
court. "[T]he [restitution] statute's purposes are penal, not
compensatory. Thus restitution must be understood as an aspect of
criminal law, not as a quasi-civil recovery device." Dillon, 637
P.2d at 607 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
-[footnote continued on next page]-
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P.2d at 165. Such unauthorized amounts would encompass the cost of
"code R" examinations and the money used in "sting" operations.
Recognition of Pettity however, would authorize the latter cost when
both expenditures were "incurred by the prosecution in the course of
the investigation and prior to the time of the filing of the
criminal information."

Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 165. Pettit cannot be

followed in Utah because of its incomplete and inapposite analysis.
Utah's statutory authority is more expansive.
Investigations into drug-related crimes and sexual offenses
remain a necessary part of law enforcement.

However, apart from the

"first-blush" emotional reaction which justifiably inures from these
offenses, the mandate by our supreme court remains principled and
clear.

Our high court concluded unanimously that these inherent

investigatory costs are nonrecoverable and unauthorized under Utah
law.

See Depaoli, 835 P.2d at 164 ("$165 for a code R examination

of the victim sexually assaulted by defendant" is a nonrecoverable
investigative cost for the SLCPD); accord People v. Evans, 461
N.E.2d 634 (111. App. 3 Dist. 1984) ("Where public monies are
expended in the pursuit of solving crimes, the expenditure is part
of the investigating agency's normal operating costs. The

2 -[footnote cont'd]Similarly, the State's attempt here to use Pettit as a
compensatory justification or as a "quasi-civil recovery device" for
the $240 should be rejected under Utah law. Just as money was
"taken" (but not "recovered") by police in Depaoli for the code R
exam, so too are such investigative expenses "taken" (but not
"recovered") by police here for the "sting" operation. The Depaoli
decision does not authorize either cost.
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governmental entity conducting an investigation is not therefore
considered a "victim" to the extent that public monies are so
expended"); cf. Depaolif 835 P.2d at 164 (citing State v. Martin, 56
Or. App. 639, 642 P.2d 1196 (1982) ("where the court held that the
expense of towing the defendant's vehicle from the scene of a rape
was not a proper item for restitution"); Opening brief of
Mr. Garcia, page 6 (citing cases).

The trial court's sentence

ordering Mr. Garcia to pay $240 in restitution should be vacated.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Garcia respectfully requests
this Court to reverse the trial court's order of restitution.
SUBMITTED this

lh

day of August, 1993.

RONALD SL FlirjTJINO
C
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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